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BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 78-2-2(j), Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 
3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. The trial court correctly allowed appellee to amend 
his complaint. There was no prejudice to appellant as he had ample 
time to respond to appellee's supplement and amendment to his 
verified complaint. And if it was error of the trial court to 
allow appellee to amend his complaint such error was harmless. 
B. Appellant was already a party to the lawsuit 
pursuant to his intervention thus the statute of limitations on 
conversion and laches are inapplicable. 
C. The trial court justly awarded prejudgment interest 
in this case as appellant was the cause of the delay and said 
prejudgment interest could be obtained with mathematical accuracy. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee is in substantial agreement with the standard of 
review as set forth in appellant's brief, and notes that appellee 
sets forth in the body of his brief cases that support his position 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final decision and judgment 
rendered in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Uintah County, 
State of Utah, on May 5, 1997. Said action was initiated by 
appellee as a partnership dissolution. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
While Appellant's statement of the Course of Proceedings 
is correct in the particulars it describes, it is incomplete both 
in some events described and in failing to include other pertinent 
steps in this case's history, which are listed below. 
At the open court stipulation on November 8, 1989, the 
original Defendant, Michael Zellmer (Zellmer hereafter) through his 
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counsel offered to post as collateral in lieu of bond the inventory 
of the partnership sought to be dissolved by Plaintiff James 
Miller's (Miller hereafter) Complaint. Zellmer also agreed to 
furnish a listing of that inventory to the court. Judge Draney 
asked Zellmer, who was present in court, if he had heard the 
statement made by his attorney. Zellmer responded in the 
affirmative. The court then asked: "Do you agree to be bound by 
it? he answered, "Yes sir." (R. 18, Trial Exhibit #1-P, R. 506) 
After filing an Answer and Counterclaim on May 25, 1990, 
Zellmer without leave of the court, sold the inventory to Michael 
Weyland, (Weyland hereafter) about which more will be said in the 
Argument hereafter, (Trial Exhibits 2, 3, 4, R. 506) 
Upon learning of the sale Miller filed on September 7, 
1990 a Motion for Contempt against Zellmer for disregarding the 
Stipulation. 
Following efforts by way of stipulation between counsel 
for Miller and Zellmer to place the inventory back under the 
court's jurisdiction, which efforts failed, Zellmer's counsel 
withdrew. (R. 44) Miller's counsel notified Zellmer (who had 
moved to California) to Appoint new counsel. Failing so to do the 
court pursuant to Motion struck Zellmer's pleadings and entered 
Judgment for Miller on March 26, 1991. On April 2, 1991 Execution 
on Judgment issued, and the Sheriff picked-up and delivered the 
inventory to Miller. 
April 9, 1991 Weyland moved for leave to Intervene and to 
Set Aside the Judgment. Zellmer on May 3, 1991 moved to Set Aside 
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the Judgment and later moved for leave to amend his Answer and 
Counterclaim. As Appellant has observed the Motions were granted, 
and Miller (appellee) returned the assets to Weyland. 
Contrary to assertions in Appellant's Brief that "no 
activity of any significance occurred in this matter" from October 
1991 to May 16, 1996, the Index (R. 427-433) shows further 
discovery, Certificate of Service of Request for Production of 
Documents, Request for Trial Date by Zellmer's counsel, and a later 
motion of Zellmer's counsel to be permitted to Withdraw, and Order 
relating thereto, Request for Trial Date by Miller on April 7, 1993 
and on April 30, 1993, an Objection to Request for Trial date by 
Weyland7s counsel (R. 427-9) That Objection is significant for two 
reasons: first, in was Weyland, through counsel, who was delaying 
the proceeding of the case, and second, his basis for Objection was 
to plead the Bankruptcy of Zellmer, which is alleged therein as 
having been filed January 21, 1993 in California. It concludes: 
"Much discovery and motion work is necessary prior to this case 
being ready for trial." (R. 428) From April 30, 1993 to May 16, 
1996 no discovery was undertaken nor was any motion filed by 
Weyland's counsel. 
Also, while it is not a part of the record per se, Judge 
Draney died during this time frame. The record does disclose that 
as of January 18, 1994 the case had been assigned to Judge 
Anderson's Calendar. (R. 430) 
The statements in Appellant's Course of Proceedings 
section covering the period from May 16, 1996 thereafter are 
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correct. 
The references to the record in this Course of 
Proceedings section are set out in the order referred to herein as 
Addendum A attached. 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Appellee takes exception with only one statement in 
Appellant's Disposition in Trial Court and that is "2. ... to 
amend his complaint to add appellant as a defendant..." Whereas 
appellee holds that appellant was a party to this lawsuit from May 
3, 1991, and thus did not add appellant by his motion to amend and 
supplement his verified complaint. Otherwise appellee does not 
quarrel with appellant's "Disposition in Trial Court" section of 
his brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is also incomplete in the 
following particulars: 
In paragraph 1, appellant states that the action was 
initiated for the "enforcement" of a partnership agreement. The 
action was rather a judicial termination of a partnership. (See 
prayer of Verified Complaint, R. 3-9) 
The open court stipulation of November 8, 1989 was not a 
"stipulation before the Court to settle this action." but rather 
a temporary agreement to allow Zellmer to retain the business 
assets during the pendency of the action on condition, as noted 
above, that he pledge those assets to the court, and furnish the 
court a written inventory of the partnership assets. (R. 18 and 
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Trial Exhibit 1-P, R. 506) 
When Zellmer disregarded the Stipulation of November 8, 
1989 and sold the partnership assets, together with whatever 
separate assets of his own and the business name "Atlantis Divers" 
possessed, to Weyland on June 6, 1990, he did not "promise the he, 
Zellmer, owed no responsibility to his former business partner, 
Appellee, for said property, and that he, Mr. Zellmer, would 
otherwise hold Appellant harmless should any claim arise" as 
claimed by Appellant. The language of the hold-harmless document 
does not so state. It says that the assets are "free of all liens. 
Any claims against those assets that may arrize (sic) from James 
Miller or Miller Diving, Inc. will be the sole responsibility of 
Michael D. Zellmer and/or P & M Diving, Inc." (emphasis added) 
(Trial Exhibit 3, R. 506) 
Counsel for Miller and Zellmer attempted to obtain a 
Stipulation to bring the partnership assets under the supervision 
of the court. The Stipulation was prepared leaving the name of the 
purchaser of the assets blank. Zellmer's attorney was to ascertain 
the buyer's name, and insert it into the stipulation and have it 
executed by the buyer. (Trial exhibit 7) Both counsel signed it, 
but Weyland refused. At trial Weyland, when asked about the 
stipulation responded: 
"A. Again, I read that this morning, and I don't remember 
seeing it. 
"Q. When you said you read it this morning, what did you read 
this morning? 
6 
"A. That thing from Mr. Beaslin [Zellmer's then attorney] 
that you were speaking of, I believe. 
"Q. Do you have a copy of it here? I hand you what's been 
marked Exhibit 7 and ask if that's the stipulation and order that 
we have been talking about? 
"A* Yes sir. I read it this morning. And I just do not 
remember seeing it before. I don't know whether I have ever had 
[it] or not, I just don't remember." (Transcript of trial, R. 585) 
He was then asked about his deposition given August 15, 
1991, which he admitted giving, and the deposition was upon motion 
published (Transcript, R. 585). The pertinent questions and 
answers in the deposition were then reviewed, and he acknowledged 
them as being his. They are: 
MQ. What I am getting at, the lawsuit itself started before 
your purchase. So the question is — you knew that Mr. Miller was 
an ex-partner? 
11
 A. That's correct. 
MQ. Did Mr. Zellmer disclose to you at any time in your 
negotiations that litigation was then pending when the sale 
occurred? 
MA. Not that I remember. 
f,Q. When did you first learn that there was litigation? 
"A. Really not until I received the paperwork from Mr. 
Beaslin in October. 
"Q. Had Mr. Zellmer at any time prior to October 1989 told 
you that the inventory was pledged to the court? 
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"A. No. 
"Q. So your first understanding of that possibility came when 
you got the documentation from Beaslin? 
"A. No sir. 
MQ. In October? 
"Q. The documentation I got from Beaslin, the way I 
understood it, was asking me to sign this stipulation, I believe it 
is called, that it would be pledged to the court at that time. 
MQ. You had no indication from Beaslin or any other source 
that it had been previously pledged? 
f,A. That's correct." (published deposition of Michael Weyland 
pps. 20-21) 
At Statement of Fact #5, Appellant, quotes the Ruling of 
Judge Draney of April 9, 1991 which permits Weyland's entry as 
Intervenor and Third Party Plaintiff, but he fails to quote some 
critical language. He does, however, put the whole Ruling at the 
back of his brief as Exhibit "F". The pertinent language is: 
"During the pendency of this action, Weyland shall account for all 
sales and rentals of the equipment and inventory purchased from 
Zellmer, and shall weekly deposit with the court the accounting and 
the proceeds of such sales and rentals." (R. 140) 
When asked about that portion of Judge Draney's Ruling at 
trial, Weyland responded as follows: 
"Q. Now, when you then had those assets taken by Mr. Miller 
and you hired an attorney to be allowed to intervene and to set 
aside the judgment and ask to be allowed to intervene as a party, 
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the court ultimately made a ruling on the 3rd of May, is that 
correct, of 1991? 
"A. I believe so, yes. 
"Q. And you were aware that [of the] provisions in that 
ruling, is that also correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And calling your attention to the last sentence of the 
next to last paragraph, the underlying [underlined?] language 
provides that you were to furnish the court weekly accountings as 
to what was to happen to those assets; is that also correct? 
"A. Yes, I remember that. 
"Q. Did you ever make any such accountings? 
"A. No, I didn't. 
He was then asked about a letter, He then admitted that 
he received the assets back from Miller. Then returning to his 
duty to segregate and make accountings he was asked: 
"Q. And did you commingle the assets in a sense that it would 
be impossible to really try to segregate and keep separate what was 
part of the old partnership and what part of your new involvement? 
"A. Yes, it was commingled." (R. 581-582) 
In Statement of Fact #9, and earlier in his Disposition 
in Trial Court section, Appellant asserts that Judge Anderson in 
granting Miller's Motion to Amend and claim Conversion, he says the 
court allowed Miller to "add Appellant as a defendant" as though 
Weyland was just then being inserted into the action. He further 
states that the court "did not address Appellant's statute of 
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limitations argument." 
At trial, Judge Anderson explained specifically what he 
had in mind at the time he granted said Motion to Amend as follows: 
"The Statute of Limitations question, 
although I have to admit when I ruled on the 
parties' Motion to Amend the Complaint to 
assert a cause of, a new claim for conversion, 
I take the position in the pleadings that 
Weyland was in the lawsuit from '91. Weyland 
reasonably anticipated what could have been 
asked for. It's one of those situations where 
the claim was not a complete surprise to him. 
I believe that if the parties are in the 
lawsuit, the pleadings could always be amended 
to conform to the evidence. The Motion to 
Amend was not made, was made in enough time to 
respond or be prepared for it. And I analyzed 
it and decided that I would grant the motion 
and allow that claim to be stated and that it 
wouldn't prejudice anyone unduly. 
"And I had to be thinking at the time, 
and I rule now that the Statute of Limitations 
has not run because of his being in the 
lawsuit from '91, that the claim could have 
reasonably been asserted. Both parties were 
in this lawsuit. And I think the Statute 
would not have begin [sic] to run until the 
date of trial." (R. 609 - 610) 
The references to the record in this Statement of Facts 
section are set out in the order referred to herein as Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEE'S SUPPLEMENT AND AMENDMENT TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT RELATES BACK TO APPELLEE'S ORIGINAL FILING AND IS 
NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR IS 
APPELLANT CONSIDERED A NEW DEFENDANT. 
This case began as a judicial partnership dissolution 
between appellee and Michael Zellmer. Appellant became involved in 
this matter upon his own motion to intervene. He claimed an 
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interest and ownership in the partnership assets as he wrongfully 
purchased the assets from Zellmer. Due to appellant's delay in not 
proceeding with the discovery he desired when he objected to 
appellee's notice of readiness for trial, appellee sought and was 
granted leave to amend his verified complaint. 
Appellee amended his complaint to include a cause of 
action against appellant for conversion. Appellee then filed a 
notice of readiness for trial on September 3, 1996. 
The statute of limitations on conversion has not run as 
appellant was a party to this lawsuit since his intervention and 
appellee did not by his supplement and amendment to his complaint 
add him as a new party. 
II. THIS CASE COULD HAVE BEEN SET FOR TRIAL WITHOUT APPELLEE'S 
MOTION TO AMEND, AND THEREFORE IF IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO GRANT APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AMEND IT WAS HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
Trial could have been had without appellee's motion to 
amend and the pleadings would have been deemed conformed to the 
evidence. So if it was error for the trial court to grant leave to 
amend it was harmless error. 
III. LACHES IS AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE AND WILL NOT RELIEVE APPELLANT 
OF HIS WRONGDOING AND HAS NO APPLICATION IN THIS LAWSUIT. 
Appellant's argument of laches is also without merit as 
it is an equitable doctrine allowing the trial court the discretion 
to allow or disallow laches as a defense. Laches requires meeting 
a two prong test, (1) lack of diligence and (2) that lack of 
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diligence caused an injury to the party claiming laches. It was 
appellant's objection to trial that resulted in the delay not 
appellee. And the delay did not cause injury to appellant in fact 
he benefited from the delay. 
IV. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE AWARDED TO APPELLEE AS IT CAN 
BE ASCERTAINED WITH MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY. 
The prejudgment interest as awarded by the trial court 
should be upheld because the loss can be fixed at a definite time 
and it can be shown with mathematical certainty what that damage 
involved. 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Attorney's fees should be awarded as this appeal is 
meritless, and substantially reduces appellee's judgment. This 
appeal was instituted to further delay appellee's judgment in his 
favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEE'S SUPPLEMENT AND AMENDMENT TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT RELATES BACK TO APPELLEE'S ORIGINAL FILING AND IS NOT IN 
VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR IS APPELLANT CONSIDERED 
A NEW DEFENDANT. 
Appellant correctly set forth part of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure regarding the provisions for amendment of a 
pleading. Said Rule fully states in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Amendments [a] party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires.... 
(c) Relation back of amendments. When ever 
12 
the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice 
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to 
serve a supplemental pleading setting forth 
transactions or occurrence or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading 
sought to be supplemented. Permission may be 
granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for 
relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the 
supplemental pleading, it shall so order, 
specifying the time therefor. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a)(c)(d). 
Utah has held that "[r]elation back [to the original 
pleading] is allowed under the rules even if a statue of 
limitations has run during the intervening time. Citation omitted. 
In considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations 
are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and 
whether any party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage." 
Rinowood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 786 P.2d 1350, at 1359-1360. 
(Utah App. 1990). In Rinowood the court found that the facts upon 
which the amendment was based, namely the unauthorized selling of 
stock to third parties arose out of the same general transaction 
and that the defendants had adequate notice of the claim and were 
not prejudiced by the amendment. 
The Supreme Court of Utah when addressing the issue of 
amending a pleading stated that "rule 15 should be interpreted 
liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully 
adjudicated." Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178 at 1183 (Utah 1993). 
The Court in Timm went further to explain by citing 
Chenev v Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205, 211f 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), that: 
fl[t]he rules of civil procedure must all be 
looked to in the light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the 
parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute." 
Timm at 1183. The Court also quoted Johnson v. Brinkeraoff. 89 
Utah 530, 538-39, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1936) by stating that: 
"[t]he policy of the law is toward liberality 
in the allowance of amendments and to regard 
them favorably in order that the real 
controversy between the parties may be 
presented, their rights determined, and the 
cause decided." 
Timm at 1183. It is important to realize that this court placed 
grave importance on the ability of the other party to fully meet 
the new matter. The court explained in Thomas J. Peck & Sons v. 
Lee Rock Prods.. Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 
(1973): 
"Some tempest has been raised about the court 
allowing the plaintiff to make tardy 
amendments to the pleadings.... The pleadings 
are never more important than the case that is 
before the court.... There can be no 
prejudice in this case because we'll give 
ample time for an answer.... This is in 
harmony with what we regard as the correct 
policy: of recognizing the desirability of 
the pleadings setting forth definitely framed 
issues, but also of permitting amendment where 
the interest of justice so requires, and the 
adverse party is given a fair opportunity to 
meet it." 
Timm at 1183. 
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In the Timm case# the matter was dormant for ten years 
before the appellants attempted to amend the pleadings. The 
opposing party stated that they would be prejudiced by any 
amendment that would come after such a long dormancy. The court 
observed that the dormancy of the case was occasioned by the fault 
of neither party but for bankruptcy proceedings. The court 
mentioned that the items brought up with the amendment would 
"involve only an interpretation of the loan documents, which would 
be unaffected by the passage of time." Timm at 1183. Of 
additional interest is that in Gillman v. Hansen. 26 Utah 2d 165, 
486 P.2d 1045 (1971) , the Utah Supreme Court found that a trial 
court had abused its discretion when it refused to allow a party to 
amend its pleadings. The court stated in Timm: 
"this court has never upheld a trial court's 
refusal to grant leave to amend a pleading 
before a trial date has been set because at 
that point in the litigation, the opposing 
party will always have time to respond to the 
amended pleading.... Conversely [the court 
has] upheld a trial court's refusal to grant 
leave to amend only when the amendment was 
sought shortly before trial or at trial so 
that the opposing party did not have adequate 
time to respond." 
Timm at 1183. 
In the instant case, the motion to amend appellee's 
complaint was sought prior to a trial date being established. 
Appellant was given full opportunity to respond to appellee's 
amendment and cannot claim that he was prejudiced thereby. Much 
like the facts in Timm. all that was involved were documents which 
were all successfully produced at trial. Even getting the case to 
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trial was similar in facts to Timm as much of the delay was 
occasioned by Zellmer's bankruptcy proceedings and appellant's 
contention that the bankruptcy court must now be involved and more 
discovery needed to be completed. (R. 428). These objections were 
overcome by the time the actual trial date was set and trial was 
heard on the merits. 
As outlined above, Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provide for the contingency when the statute of 
limitations runs on a cause of action. In order to be effective, 
however, the cause of action must arise "... out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleading..." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c). 
At issue in this matter has always been ownership of the 
partnership property. When appellant purchased the partnership 
assets in bad faith, knowing of appellee's interest therein, the 
act of conversion occurred and related back to the original 
verified complaint filed by appellee. 
The statute of limitations on conversion was tolled by 
the relation back to the original pleading as appellant has been a 
party to this lawsuit from the date his motion to intervene was 
granted on May 3, 1991. (R. 140-141). Thus, appellant's 
contention that he was a new party, citing Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976) and Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of 
New York, 761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988), do not address the real 
issue. Appellant cannot in good faith claim that he was not a 
party to all proceedings of this lawsuit. 
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The trial court, when explaining why he granted appellee 
leave to amend and add as a cause of action appellee's claim of 
conversion stated: 
11
... I have to admit when I ruled on the 
parties' motion to amend the complaint to 
assert a cause of action, a new claim for 
conversion, I take the position in the 
pleadings that Weyland [appellant] was in the 
lawsuit from '91. Weyland [appellant] 
reasonably anticipated what could have been 
asked for. It's one of those situations where 
the claim was not a complete surprise to him. 
I believe that if the parties are in the 
lawsuit, the pleadings could always be amended 
to conform to the evidence. The motion to 
amend that pleading ..., was made in enough 
time to respond or to be prepared for it. And 
I analyzed it and decided that I would grant 
the motion and allow that claim to be stated 
and that it wouldn't prejudice anyone unduly. 
And I had to be thinking at the time, and 
I rule now that the statute of limitations has 
not run because of his being in the lawsuit 
from '91, that the claim could have reasonably 
been asserted both parties were in the 
lawsuit. And I think the statute would not 
have begin to run until the date of trial." 
(Record 609 - 610). 
Appellee has clearly met the requirements for a court to 
grant leave to amend its pleadings. The requirements are (1) 
timeliness of the motion; (2) justification given by movant for 
delay; and (3) no resulting prejudice to responding party. 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 854 P.2d 1025 at 1028, citing 
Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichertr 784 P.2d 1210, at 1216 
(Utah App 1989) . Further, Utah courts have held that the decision 
to allow or disallow a motion to amend a pleading is discretionary 
with the trial court. Kleinert, 854 P. 2d 1025, 1028 citing 
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Stratford v. Morgan. 689 P.2d 360, at 365 (Utah 1984) and Girard v. 
Applvby. 660 P.2d 245 at 248 (Utah 1983). 
In an action for recovery of child support and alimony 
under a Nevada decree of divorce, the trial court allowed the 
plaintiff to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The 
defendant argued that the supplemental complaint constituted a new 
and separate cause of action that cannot be allowed by the 
amendment. The Supreme Court of Utah stated that: 
"This rule has give the courts considerable 
trouble in the past due to the different 
meanings and construction of the term "cause 
of action," but as pointed out in Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 
414, 135 P.2d 919, 922, this term cannot be 
taken literally but must be given a liberal 
construction, the term is broadly descriptive, 
its use purely practical, and its bounds as 
extensive as can be conveniently and 
efficiently handled as a single unit without 
injury to substantive rights. In the above 
case we held in effect that the test is not 
whether under technical rules of pleading a 
new cause of action is introduced, but rather 
the test is whether a 'wholly different cause 
of action' or 'legal obligation' is 
introduced, that is, an amendment will be 
allowed if a change is not made in the 
liability sought to be enforced against the 
defendant. The reader is referred to the 
above cited case for an able and extensive 
discussion of the term 'cause of action.'" 
Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167, 169-170 (Utah 1954). 
It is clear that appellant could and should have been 
found liable under the pleadings as they existed before the 
amendment. Appellee out of an abundance of caution obtained leave 
to amend prior to the trial date being set. The amendment removed 
any possibility of doubt as to what appellee sought at trial, and 
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appellant had ample time to prepare and present any defense which 
he had. He clearly had none, and the lower court committed no 
error in allowing the amendment. 
II. THIS CASE COULD HAVE BEEN SET FOR TRIAL WITHOUT APPELLEE'S 
MOTION TO AMEND, AND THEREFORE IF IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO GRANT APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AMEND IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
This case could have been set for trial without 
appellee's motion to amend and tried on the basis of appellee's 
original pleading or upon appellant's Third Party Complaint. 
Appellant's Third Party Complaint sets forth essentially 
the same issue, ownership of the partnership assets. Appellant in 
his first cause of action in his Third Party Complaint prays, "A. 
That Third-Party Defendants [Appellee and Zellmer] and all persons 
claiming under them be required to set forth any and all claims in 
or to the property; B. That said claims be determined by a decree 
of this Court; C. That said decree declare and adjudge that 
Intervenors owns absolutely and is entitled to the quiet and 
peaceful possession of the Property; and that Third-Party 
Defendants and all persons claiming under them, have no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in or to the Property adverse to 
Weyland or ADI;...11 (R. 174 - 175). Based upon this section of 
appellant's third party complaint alone, trial could have been had 
on the merits of the case without need for amendment as appellant 
put at issue ownership of the partnership assets. 
Had this been set for trial without the benefit of 
appellee's amended pleadings, appellee would have been able to 
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pursue the same line of questioning regarding appellant's knowledge 
and involvement in the transaction that took place behind 
appellee's back and without his or the court's authorization as it 
was the same issue that was before the court at all times and from 
appellee's verified complaint: ownership of partnership assets. 
This court has held that M[u]nder Rule 15 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, issues not raised by the pleadings may be 
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. The Utah 
Supreme Court has observed that issues tried by express or impled 
consent shall be treated as if raised in the pleadings. Therefore, 
'even failure to amend the pleading does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues'" Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 
citing General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp.. 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
Although this discussion is not necessary as appellee 
rightfully amended his pleadings and trial was had on that basis, 
if this court finds there was error in said granting of the motion 
to amend it was harmless error as trial was still had on the merits 
of the lawsuit. 
III. LACHES IS AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE AND WILL NOT RELIEVE 
APPELLANT OF HIS WRONGDOING AND HAS NO APPLICATION IN THIS LAWSUIT. 
Laches has been described as, 
ffa creation of equity and is a specie of 
equitable estoppel. Whether a party is guilty 
of laches primarily is a question of fact and 
therefore its determination is within the 
province of the trial court. The decision to 
apply laches is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Because 
application of laches is discretionary, the 
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standard of review on appeal is whether the 
trial court properly found (l) a lack of 
diligence by the party against whom the 
defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the 
party asserting the defense." 
Ouintana v. Ouintana, 802 P.2d 488, 491 (Idaho App 1990). "Laches 
bars a recovery when there has been a delay by one a party causing 
a disadvantage to the other party. Citations Omitted. Laches has 
two elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the claimant and 
(2) an injury to the defendant because of the lack of diligence. 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 
(Utah 1990). See also: Leaver v. Grosse. 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 
(Utah 1980). 
Appellant cannot meet this standard. Although appellant 
states that he has been prejudiced by appellee's amendment to his 
complaint, appellant never sets forth what that prejudice is. No 
injury can be shown as a result of delay. In fact, just the 
opposite is true and appellant has been benefited by the delay. He 
has been able to run his business with property that was not 
rightfully his. 
If appellant wished that this lawsuit would have been 
finished years ago, he had ample time to move it forward as well. 
At any point pursuant to his objection to appellee's first notice 
of readiness for trial, appellant could have participated in more 
discovery or made his own motions for disposition of this case. 
Appellant had plenty of time to prepare for trial. There 
were no surprises and as shown by appellant's pleadings, he was 
able to defend the allegations of appellee. Appellant's laches 
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argument does not meet the standard Utah has established. Further, 
the trial court in addressing the issue of laches pointed out 
specifically that: 
"Latches [sic]: again this is a situation 
where both parties were in here. Mr. Miller 
[appellee], from his testimony here today, and 
Mr. Weyland [appellant], both, must be a 
little distressed with the court's system with 
how long it takes to do things. As an officer 
of the court here, as the lawyers, as 
everybody's aware, due process does take time. 
But due to a series of events that were 
uncontrollable, in my opinion, by virtue of 
this case and what happened here, this is one 
of those cases that should have been resolved 
before now. I am trying to look at it and do 
what I think is a fair and adequate result." 
Record at 609 - 610. 
IV, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE AWARDED TO APPELLEE AS IT CAN 
BE ASCERTAINED WITH MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY. 
This matter is not a matter of equity. The judgment 
rendered by the trial court was not equitable in nature. The 
judgment was based upon evidence proffered by appellee as to the 
value of the assets and the purchase price paid by appellant when 
he bought the assets without appellee7s knowledge back in 1991. 
The trial court found that, "[a]fter commencement of this action 
[the partnership dissolution between appellee and Zellmer] and 
before the dissolution had been effected, Zellmer sold the business 
which he had renamed Atlantis Divers to Defendant-Third Party 
Plaintiff, Michael Weyland [appellant]. The sale occurred in June 
of 1990. The purchase price was $15,388.21." (R.518). This is 
mathematical certainty and fulfills the test which Utah has 
established for the granting of prejudgment interest. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards. 653 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), a bank attached 342 head of cattle for a debt 
that was later discovered to partly belong to an intervenor. The 
bank was found to have wrongfully attached 266 head of cattle that 
belonged to the intervenor. Because of appeals the intervenor was 
not fully paid from the proceeds of a sale which was occasioned for 
the satisfaction of the debt. Regarding prejudgment interest: 
"The trial court awarded prejudgment interest 
on all items of damage from May 16, 1975, the 
date when intervenor acquired the cattle sale 
proceeds, to July 26, 1980, the date of its 
judgment. The court properly granted such 
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on 
its award of excessive interest paid to Zions 
and on its attorney fee award, both of which 
were fixed as of the time of claimed damages. 
First Security 653 P.2d 591, at 599-600. 
The court explained by citing from Biork v. April 
Industries, Inc., Utah, 560 P.2d 315 (1977): 
" [T]he law in Utah is clear[:] ... where the 
damage is complete and the amount of the loss 
is fixed as of a particular time, and that 
loss is fixed as of a particular time, and 
that loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed from that 
time and not from the date of judgment. On 
the other hand, where damages are incomplete 
or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in the case of personal 
injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc., the 
amount of the damage must be ascertained and 
assessed by the trier of the fact at the 
trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest 
is not allowed. [Emphasis added; footnote 
omitted.] 
First Security. 653 P.2d 591, at 600. 
Appellant cites Nielson v. Droubav, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 
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1982), and Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991), as 
authority that prejudgment interest should not be allowed. 
However, the court in Nielson, based its decision on whether or not 
to grant prejudgment interest in that long pending case as the 
delay was on the insistence of both parties. Here the only party 
which insisted on a delay was appellant when he objected to 
appellee's request for trial date in 1993. (R. 425-426 and 427-
429) . Thus, he cannot appear now and claim that it was appellee 
who insisted upon the delay. 
In Bellon. the court also denied prejudgment interest. 
However, in appellant's citation of a section of the Bellon. 
opinion, he leaves out a critical section explaining the court's 
rational for said denial: 
"A survey of our cases where prejudgment 
interest was awarded indicates that interest 
has been allowed in action for damage to 
personal property, in actions brought on a 
written contract, and iri an action to recover 
a liquidated overpayment of water subscription 
charges. In many of these cases, we stressed 
that the loss had been fixed as of a definite 
time and the amount of the loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy in 
accordance with well-established rules of 
damages. No case has been cited to us where 
we have allowed prejudgment interest in an 
action such as the instant case, which is for 
equitable relief. "A suit of this nature 
involving the invocation of a forfeiture 
and/or the enforcement of a purchase contract 
invokes consideration of the principles of 
equity which address themselves to the 
conscience and discretion of the trial court." 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 p.2d at 610. In view of 
the highly equitable nature of this action 
where the court has discretion in determining 
the amount, if any, to be returned to the 
defaulting vendee, we find no error in the 
denial of prejudgment interest." 
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Bellon at 1097 emphasis added. It is ironic that appellant first 
claims that the judgment in the present case is for equitable 
relief but when said equitable relief is supposedly given to 
appellee, appellant claims foul and that the trial court is 
prohibited from giving such relief. The court in Bellon did not 
say that the court can't give prejudgment interest, it only stated 
that it leaves a determination of when it would be appropriate with 
the trial court in its sound discretion. 
It is appellee's contention that the award of prejudgment 
interest was not an equitable award. The trial court was able to 
find the exact date at which appellee was injured, namely the date 
appellant purchased the partnership assets without the approval of 
appellee and to his detriment. This date of the sale occurred in 
June, 1990 and the purchase price was $15,388.21. The trial court 
determined that appellee was entitled to half the amount of the 
sale, $7,694.11, and interest at the judgment rate thereafter. 
(R.517-520) The trial court then awarded prejudgment interest to 
begin on April 9, 1991. (R. 517-520) April 9, 1991 is the date to 
which appellee was entitled to the property, namely that is the 
date that appellant filed his motion to intervene to set aside 
judgment and for order to return property. (R. 101-102). This 
process demonstrates that the trial court fixed with mathematical 
certainty the loss appellee suffered and was able to compensate him 
for his loss. It is noteworthy to point out that appellant has had 
uninterrupted use of appellee's property since he unlawfully 
purchased the partnership assets in June of 1990. Appellee has 
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seen no benefit therefrom. Additionally, as the trial court 
pointed out, appellant did not even fully pay Zellmer for the 
partnership assets and essentially obtained a wash of the amount he 
shortchanged Zellmer: 
The bulk of that is memorialized by 
exhibit 2 and as agreed upon by the parties 
was 15,388.21. That's probably the best 
evidence of the value. That's the agreed upon 
price. I don't know how it would be broken 
down. But that's what he paid for and that's 
what he got. 
The evidence is interesting too. He 
apparently didn't pay the entire amount. So 
if I give Mr. Miller [appellee] a judgment for 
half of that, Mr. Weyland [appellant] is still 
off the hook for the amount he didn't pay. So 
I guess, technically, that would belong to the 
bankruptcy trustee of Zellmer. I don't know. 
(R. 512). 
By its decision the lower court determined that the 
assets which appellant has been using belonged to appellee. By 
having the use of these assets in his business, appellant was 
spared the necessity of borrowing from the bank to buy replacement 
assets thereby saving interest on the loan. It would be wrong to 
allow appellant to retain this benefit at the expense of appellee 
who has had no use of assets or their value during that period of 
time. 
V> ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL, 
While the undersigned are well aware that the granting of 
attorneys' fees on appeal are discretionary with this court, 
Appellees wish to point out only that the court below didn't award 
attorneys fees either under the partnership statute or under the 
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bad faith defense statute (78-27-56, U.C.A., as amended), 
nevertheless Appellees contend that Appellant's appeal herein 
really is of so little merit that having to defend it works a 
hardship on Appellees. It in effect dilutes the Judgment and 
interest won in the court below. Accordingly, while we have not 
cross-appealed the awarding of no attorney's fees below, we 
respectfully request that this court grant them for having to 
defend this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons the decision of the court below in 
all particulars should be affirmed and appellee awarded attorney's 
fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 1997. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of Appellee's brief on appeal was mailed to Daniel 
S. Sam, attorney for Appellant, at his address 319 West 100 South, 
Suite A, Vernal, Utah 84078, this day of December, 1997. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 












BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON NOVEMBER 8, 1989 THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE COURTROOM 
0? THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE VERNAL. UTAH; SAID CAUSE 
BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY, MJUDGE IN 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: GORDON A. MADSENr ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1130 WEST CENTER STREET 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH 84054 
FOR THE DEFENDENT: JOHN C. BEASLIN, ESQ. 
BEASLIN & ANDERSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
185 NORTH VERNAL AVENUE 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: LET'S LOOK AT THE MATTER OF JAMES 
J. MILLER AND MILLER DIVING VERSUS ZELLMER AND D & M 
DIVING. 
AGAIN. 
MR. MADSEN, IT'S NICE TO HAVE YOU WITH US 
MR. MADSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. IT'S 
NICE TO BE HERE. 
MR. BEASLIN: WITH REFERENCE TO THIS MATTER, 
YOUR HONOR, THIS IS A PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING OF A 
BUSINESS BOTH IN SALT LAKE AND LOCATED HERE IN VERNAL. 
WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE CUT-OFF DATE WILL BE OCTOBER 
31ST AT MIDNIGHT OF THAT DAY, AND THAT ON OR BEFORE 
DECEMBER 10, 1389 MR. ZELLMER WILL SUBMIT A SPREAD SHEET 
OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE BUSINESS UP TO THE OCTOBER 
31ST TIME, AND HAVE THAT IN THE HANDS OF MR. MILLER BY 
THAT TIME. AND WE WILL ALSO THEN PUT UP AS A SECURITY 
AGREEMENT THE INVENTORY OF THE ITEMS HERE IN VERNAL AS 
OF APRIL 1, 1989. 
THE COURT: IS MR. ZELLMER PRESENT? 
MR. BEASLIN: HE IS. 
THE COURT: MR. ZELLMER, HAVE YOU HEARD THE 
STATEMENT MADE BY YOUR ATTORNEY? 
MR. ZELLMER: YES, SIR. I HAVE, 
















DO YOU UNDERSTAND IT? 
: YES, SIR. 
DO YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY IT? 
: YES, SIR. 
IS THIS AGREEABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF, 
MR. MILLER IS HERE AS WELL. 
MR. MILLER, HAVE YOU HEARD THE 















DO YOU UNDERSTAND IT? 
I DO. 
AND DO YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE 
YES, I DO. 
ALL RIGHT. 
COUNSEL, I WOULD LIKE MR. BEASLIN, IF YOU 
WOULD, TO REDUCE THAT 
RECORD OF IT. 
MR. MADSEN: 
APPRECIATE THAT. 
TO WRITING AND WE CAN HAVE A CLEAR 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. WE 
* * * 1 
COMFUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 4 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
If MILO N. HARMON, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED 
AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME 
WAS SUBSEOUENTLY BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN 
FORM CONSISTING OF FAGES 3 THROUGH 4, INCLUSIVE; AND 
THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF TESTIMONY GIVEN. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
24TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1990, AT VERNAL, UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH. 
MILO N. HARMON, CSR 
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 51) 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
AUGUST 1, 1991 
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JOHN C. BEASLIN, 0258, of 
Beaslin & Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant 
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1 
Telephone: 801/789-1201 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLER, ET AL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET AL, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 890800180 CN 
Judge Dennis L. Draney 
COMES NOW JOHN C. BEASLIN, of the firm of Beaslin & Anderson, 
lereby withdraws as counst 
day of November, 1990, 
and he nsel for the above named Defendant, this 
CERTIFI 
IN & ANDERSON 
M^ahfi C. Beaslin 
OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that f mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Withdrawal of Counsel to Gordon A. Madsen, Esq., Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 1130 West Center . Street, North Salt Lake, Utah 
84054, postage prepaid on the o?^^~^ dayof November, 1990. 
^ Z ^ r / 
n Riddle 
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I hereby certify that on the 21st day of November, 1997, true and correct copies of the 
Updated Index were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Utah Court of Appeals, at 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT 84102, Mr. Daniel Sam, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs, at 319 West 100 South, Suite A, Vernal, UT 84078, and to Mr. Gordon Madsen 
and Mr. Michael D. Cummings, Attorneys for Defendants, at 225 South 200 East, Suite 150, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
JSa. 
Deputy Clerk 
LARRY A. STEELE, #3090 
STEELE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Michael Weyland and 
Atlantis Divers, Inc., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
319 West 100 South, Suite A 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone (801) 789-1301 
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STATE OF UTAH 




MICHAEL D. ZELLMER and P & M ) 
DIVING, INC., ) 
Defendants. ) OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR 
TRIAL DATE 
MICHAEL WEYLAND and ATLANTIS ) Case No. 890800180 CN 
DIVERS, INC., a Utah corporation, ) 
Intervenors & Third Party ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
JAMES J. MILLER; MILLER ) 
DIVING, INC.; MICHAEL D. ) 
ZELLMER; P & M DIVING, INC.; and ) 
DIVE UTAH VERNAL a/k/a DIVE UTAH ) 
EAST, a Utah General Partnership, ) 




V 2 7 
Intervenors and Third Party Plaintiffs, Michael Weyland and 
Atlantis Divers, Inc., respectfully object to the Plaintiffs' 
Request for Trial Date upon the following grounds: 
1. Clark Allred filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on 
December 4, 1992. 
2. Since Mr. Allred's withdrawal, no attorney has appeared on 
behalf of Defendants Michael D. Zellmer and P & M Diving, Inc. 
3. The Defendant, Michael D. Zellmer, has filed for 
bankruptcy on January 21, 1993, Case No. SA93-10600 JB, in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, P. 0. Box 12600, 34 Civic Center 
Plaza, Room 506, Santa Ana, CA. 92701-4025. 
4. The Defendant, Michael D. Zellmer, is a necessary party 
and the case cannot be resolved without his participation. 
Bankruptcy issues are now involved and must be resolved by motion. 
Resolution may require the removal of this case to the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
5. The real issues were between Miller and Zellmer and Mike 
Weyland purchased the assets in good faith. 
6. Much discovery and motion work is necessary prior to this 
case being ready for trial. 
DATED this Wc&fp day of April, 199 
LARR 
2 
Cs > SS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Trisha Hamner, do hereby certify that I mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection 
to Request for Trial Date, on this 3&&J0 day of April, 1993, to: 
Michael D* Zellmer, 16761 Viewpoint Lane, #308, Huntington Beach, 
CA. 92647, Gordon A. Madsen, Attorney at Law, 1130 West Center 
Street, North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054. 
Trisha Hamner, Secretary 
mon zellmer.obj 
^2f 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MILLER, JAMES J. 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ZELLMER, MICHAEL D. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890800180 CN 
DATE 01/18/94 
HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CJW 





THE FILE IN THIS MATTER WAS ADDED TO JUDGE ANDERSON'S CALENDAR 
ON JANUARY 18, 1994 BUT THE COURT CAN FIND NO REASON WHY THE 
CASE SHOULD BE ON THE CLAENDAR. THE COURT STRIKES THIS MATTER 
FROM THE CALENDAR. 
GORDON A, MADSEN #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: 298-6610 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
JAMES J, MILLER and MILLER : 
DIVING,INC., a Utah corporation: 
Plaintiffs, : VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
vs. : 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER and P & M 
DIVING,INC., a Utah corporation: Civil No. 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs complain of Defendants and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiff James J. Miller is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Plaintiff Miller Diving, Inc. is a Utah 
corporation whose principal place of business is located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant Zellmer is a resident of 
Uintah County, State of Utah. Defendant P & M Diving, Inc. is a 
Utah corporation whose principal place of business is located in 
Uintah County, State of Utah. 
2. On or about August 1986 Plaintiffs and Defendants 
entered into a partnership known as Dive Utah Vernal, which 
operated a Scuba Diving business at 50 South 1500 West, #31, 
Vernal, Utah. Defendant Zellmer was the principal operating 
officer who managed the business and kept the books of the 
business. 
3. During the period of approximately August 1986 
through March 1989, Defendant Zellmer submitted somewhat regular 
accountings to Plaintiff concerning the operations of the business. 
Thereafter such accountings stopped and the parties, following a 
discussion of several matters executed on May 23, 1989 an amendment 
or "addition11 to the partnership agreement, which "addition" is 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
reference as though set out in full. 
4. On or about July 11, 1989 Plaintiff received by 
certified mail from Defendants a notice of intent to dissolve the 
partnership, accompanied with a proposal substantially out of 
accord with Exhibit "A". Plaintiff responded by mail on July 19, 
1989 that such proposal was unacceptable and insisted that the May 
23, 1989 "addition" (Exhibit "A") applied. Defendants have since 
refused to dissolve the partnership or render any accounting, 
notwithstanding repeated requests for the same made by Plaintiffs. 
Moreover, Defendants are in control of the partnership books and 
assets, and are carrying on the business at a new location in 
Vernal, Utah, whether in the partnership name or otherwise, which 
is a willful breach of the terms of Exhibit "A" and continuation 
of a partnership business is not reasonable practicable. 
5. Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 48-1-29 (c) 
and (d) Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial dissolution and 
decree of distribution of partnership assets. 
6. Plaintiffs have been required to obtain the services 
of an attorney to bring this action to obtain a judicial 
dissolution of the partnership and are entitled to reasonable 
attorneys fees therefor, as the court determines. 
7. Plaintiffs are further reasonably apprehensive that 
unless the above entitled court issue an Order to Show Cause 
requiring Defendants to appear before it on a day and time certain 
to show cause, if any they have, why they should not be restrained 
from continuing to operate the business with partnership assets, 
or in the alternative post a good and sufficient bond for the 
protection of Plaintiff's interests, irreparable harm to Plaintiffs 
will result. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray: 
1. That the court issue an Order to Show Cause requiring 
the Defendants to appear before it on a day and time certain, to 
show cause, if any they have, why they should not be restrained 
from continuing to operate the scuba diving business with the 
partnership assets, or in the alternative why they should not post 
a good and sufficient bond for the protection of Plaintiffs' 
interests during the pendency of this action. 
2. For an Order requiring Defendants to render a full 
and correct accounting of the management and operation of the 
partnership business. 
3• For an Order dissolving the partnership and 
distributing to the former partners the assets of the partnership 
as their interests appear and in compliance with the terms of 
Exhibit nA,w and for reasonable attorneys fees. 
4. For whatever other relief the court in the premises 
deems appropriate. 
Dated this 30th da^ >»£-ffligTrst, 1989. 
Gafrdon A. Madsen ^**^v^^ 
J&torney for Plaintiffs ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
James J. Miller, upon his oath deposes and says: 
That he is one of the Plaintiffs in the above entitled 
action; that he has read the above Complaint and affirms that the 
contents thereof are true to his own knowledge and best information 
and belief. 
ss/ 
James J. Miller, Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn before me a Notary Public this 




My commission expires: 
GORDON A. MADSEN #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLER, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. : STIPULATION & ORDER 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET AL, : Civil No. 890800180 CN 
Defendants. : Judge Dennis L. Draney 
Plaintiffs and Defendants by and through their respective 
counsel do Stipulate as follows: 
1. That inasmuch as an earlier Stipulation entered in 
open court on November 8, 1989 in the above entitled action, 
wherein it was agreed that the assets of the partnership known as 
Dive Utah Vernal could be held as collateral or security in lieu 
of a bend to protect Plaintiffs' claims asserted herein, and the 
parties further agreed that no assets would be sold except in the 
ordinary course of business and orderly replaced, 
2. And, since Defendant Zellmer has since said 
Stipulation sold all or most of said assets to a buyer now engaged 
in operating a scuba diving business in Vernal, Utah known as 
Atlantis Divers, which is a sole proprietorship of 
who is to be bound by the following 
stipulation, and executes this agreement individually and on behalf 
of Atlantis Divers. 
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED, that the assets of the scuba 
business comprising inventory, compressor, rental gear, fixtures 
and other personal property, formerly the assets of a partnership 
known as Dive Utah Vernal, now in the possession of 
d/b/a Atlantis Divers may be and are, by this 
Stipulation made subject to the above-entitled litigation and held 
subject to the court's Order herein. It is further stipulated and 
agreed that any inventory, rental gear or other asset sold 
hereafter shall require the deposit of the money received therefor 
into a bank account No. , located in the 
Bank, Vernal Utah, in trust, and that the same may not 
be disbursed except upon Order of the above-entitled court. 
Dated this day of October, 1990. 
'John C. Beaslin 
Attorney for Plaintiffs [/ Attorney for Defendants 
, Individually 
and as sole proprietor of Atlantis 
Divers 
ORDER 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties herein and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the assets referred to in the 
above Stipulation together with the bank account also identified 
above to be opened at Bank is hereby 
impressed with a lien and said assets and account shall not be 
removed, sold, disbursed or withdrawn EXCEPT upon written Order of 
this court. 
Dated this day of October 1990 
BY THE COURT 
District Judge 
1 A AGAIN, I READ THAT THIS MORNING, AND I DON'T 
2 REMEMBER SEEING IT. 
3 Q WHEN YOU SAID YOU READ IT THIS MORNING, WHAT DID 
4 YOU READ THIS MORNING? 
5 A THAT THING FROM MR. BEASLIN THAT YOU WERE SPEAKING 
6 OF, I BELIEVE. 
7 Q DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF IT HERE? I HAND YOU WHAT'S 
8 BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT 7 AND ASK IF THAT'S THE STIPULATION AND 
9 ORDER THAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT? 
10 A YES, SIR. I READ IT THIS MORNING. AND I JUST DO 
11 NOT REMEMBER SEEING IT BEFORE. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER I HAVE 
12 EVER HAD OR NOT, I JUST DON'T REMEMBER. 
13 Q WELL, LET ME -- DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF YOUR OWN 
14 DEPOSITION THAT WAS TAKEN IN AUGUST OF 1991? 
15 A I MAY HAVE. BUT I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
15 Q HAVE YOU LOOKED AT IT LATELY? 
17 A NO. 
13 Q I AM GOING TO BE READING. MAY WE HAVE IT 
19 PUBLISHED, YOUR HONOR? IF I CAN APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
20 HONOR? 
21 THE COUR.T: YOU MAY. THIS 13 THE DEPOSITION OF 
22 MICHAEL WEYLAND. IT MAY BE PUBLISHED CM REQUEST. I'LL KEEP 
23 THAT ENVELOPE IF YOU WANT. 
24 MR. MADSEN: ALL RIGHT. CALLING YOUR ATTENTION TO 
25 PAGE 20, THESE WERE THE QUESTIONS AND THE ANSWERS, I BELIEVE. 
42 
Q I just want your best estimate at this point. 
It will be reflected in your books, I am assuming; is that 
right? 
A Yes. Eight to ten classes. 
Q And income from the classes as it's been going into 
the business along with the sales of inventory, I take it? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you first learn of the initiation of this 
lawsuit between Mr. Miller and Mr. Zellmer? 
A I received a call from Mr. Zellmer, and he said 
that he had been contacted — bear with me, I have not slept 
within the last 24 hours and I am trying to get my mind to 
work here. 
Q What I am getting at, the lawsuit itself started 
before your purchase. So the question is .— you knew that Mr. 
Miller was an ex-partner? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did Mr. Zellmer disclose to you at any time in your 
negotiations that litigation was then pending when the sale 
occurred? 
A Not that I remember. 
Q When did you first~Iearn that there was litigation? 
A Really not until I received the paperwork from Mr. 
Beaslin in October. 
Q Had Mr. Zellmer at any time prior to October 1989 
20 
Computerized Transcript 
told you that the inventory was pledged to the court? 
A No. 
Q So your first understanding of that possibility 
came when you got the documentations from Beaslin? 
A No, sir. 
Q In October? 
A The documentation I got from Beaslin, the way I 
understood it, was asking me to sign this stipulation, I 
believe it is called, that it would be pledged to the court at 
that time. 
Q You had no indication from Beaslin or any other 
source that it had been previously_pledged? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did you make any independent inquiry of the court 
at the time you received the material from Beaslin to see what * 
the status really was? '' 
A I didn't make an independent inquiry of the court, 
but my son contacted the Department of Commerce to see if 
there was any liens on any properties or whatnot, and there 
was none at that time. 
Q Well, that has to do with any recorded lien « 
pursuant to a contract? Did you explore any other possible 
encumbrance or lien or anything other than going to the 
Department of Commerce? 
A We did not. 
21 
Computerized Transcript 
1 BILL OF SALE, THE PURCHASE PRICE WAS $15,233; IS THAT CORRECT?. 
2 A YES. 
3 Q AND THAT'S WHAT YOU IN ARM'S LENGTH AGREED TO PAY 
4 FOR THAT BUSINESS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
5 A I MISSED THAT PART OF THAT LAST STATEMENT. 
6 Q THAT'S WHAT YOU BARGAINED TO PAY FOR THE BUSINESS? 
7 A YES. 
8 Q THAT'S WHAT YOU THOUGHT WAS ITS FAIR MARKET VALUE; 
9 IS THAT CORRECT? 
10 A YES. 
11 Q AT THAT TIME? 
12 A YES. THE PORTIONS THAT I PURCHASED, YES. 
13 Q NOW, WHEN YOU THEN HAD THOSE ASSETS TAKEN BY 
14 MR. MILLER AND YCU HIRED AN ATTORNEY TO BE ALLOWED TO 
15 INTERVENE AND TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ASK TO BE ALLOWED 
IS TO INTERVENE AS A PARTY, THE COURT ULTIMATELY MADE A RULING ON 
17 THE 3RD OF MAY, IS THAT CORRECT, OF 1991? 
13 A I BELIEVE SO, YES. 
19 Q AND YOU WERE AWARE THAT PROVISION'S IN THAT RULING, 
20 IS THAT ALSO, CORRECT? 
21 A YES. 
:5f~ Q AND CALLING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF 
23 THE NEXT TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH, THE UNDERLYING LANGUAGE 
24 PROVIDES THAT YOU WERE TO FURNISH THE COURT WEEKLY ACCOUNTINGS 
25 AS TO WHAT WAS TO HAPPEN TO THOSE ASSETS; IS THAT ALSO 
45 
,:; ^  *. 
1 CORRECT? 
2 A YES, I REMEMBER THAT. 
3 Q DID YOU EVER MAKE ANY SUCH ACCOUNTINGS? 
4 A NO, I DIDN'T. 
5 Q AND, IN THAT CONNECTION, LET ME NOW SHOW YOU 
6 EXHIBIT NO. 6 AND ASK IF THE COPY OF THAT WAS EVER FURNISHED 
7 TO YOU BY YOUR ATTORNEY, IF YOU CAN REMEMBER? 
8 A OKAY. YOUR QUESTION AGAIN, SIR? 
9 Q THE QUESTION IS, DO YOU REMEMBER EVER GETTING THAT 
10 LETTER OR DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE THEREOF WITH YOUR ATTORNEY? 
11 A I BELIEVE WE DISCUSSED THE SUBSTANCE OF IT. I 
12 PROBABLY HAVE A COPY OF THE LETTER. 
13 Q ALL RIGHT. YOU HAVEN'T SEEN IT BEFORE, COUNSEL. 
14 A2ID I WON'T MOVE TO INTRODUCE IT UNTIL YCU TELL MS YOU HAVE 
15 HAD A CHANCE TO CONTINUE. ALL RIGHT. IF I CAN CONTINUE. 
16 FOLLOWING THAT MAY 3RD, '91 ORDER, DID YOU EXAMINE 
17 THE RETURN OF THE MERCHANDISE, THE BUSINESS ASSETS TO YOU? 
13 DID YOU CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME ATLANTIS DIVING 
13 AT THAT LOCATION IN VERNAL? 
20 A YES. 
21 Q AND DID YCU COMMINGLE THE ASSETS IN A SENSE THAT IT 
22 WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REALLY TRY TO SEGREGATE AND KEEP 
23 SEPARATE WHAT WAS PART OF THE OLD PARTNERSHIP AND WHAT WAS 
24 PART OF YOUR NEW INVOLVMENT? 
25 A YES. IT WAS COMMINGLED. 
4S 
1 IMPORTANT, AND I EVALUATE THE ATTORNEY'S FEES THIS WAY: I 
2 THINK THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES WOULD BE ASSESSED IN A 
3 PARTNERSHIP, A TRUE PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION. BUT WEYLAND GOT 
4 INTO THIS CASE AS AN OUTSIDER AND PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE 
5 OBLIGATED TO PAY ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. I THINK THE REVERSE IS 
6 TRUE. I DON'T THINK THERE IS A DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD FAITH OR 
7 BAD FAITH SUFFICIENT ENOUGH HERE TO ASSESS ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
8 THIS CASE ON EITHER PARTY. 
9 I DO THINK THAT MR. MILLER'S ENTITLED TO INTEREST 
10 FROM APRIL 9TH OF '91. I DON'T KNOW IF 10% IS THE FIGURE. I 
11 THINK IT SHOULD BE THE JUDGMENT RATE. AND MAYBE BY STATUTE 
12 THAT WAS THE JUDGMENT RATE UNTIL WHAT, THREE YEARS AGO? I'LL 
13 HAVE COUNSEL FIGURE THAT OUT. 
14 MR. MADSEN: CO YOU WANT ME TO USE A JUDGMENT RATS 
15 RATHER THAN THE LEGAL RATE, YOUR HONOR? 
16 THE COURT: YES. 
17 MR. MADSEN: ALL RIGHT. FROM APRIL 9TH? 
18 THE COURT: THAT'S THE AMOUNT YOU WOULD BE ENTITLED 
19 TO ON A TORT CLAIM; ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
20 MR. MADSEN: YES. FROM APRIL 9TH, '91, YOUR HONOR? 
21 THE COURT: YES. 
22 MR. MADSEN: ALL RIGHT. 
W THE COURT: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS QUESTION, 
24 ALTHOUGH I HAVE TO ADMIT WHEN I RULED ON THE PARTIES' MOTION 
25 TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION, A NEW 
5 
1 CLAIM FOR CONVERSION, I TAKE THE POSITION IN THE PLEADINGS 
2 THAT WEYLAND WAS IN THE LAWSUIT FROM '91. WEYLAND REASONABLY 
3 ANTICIPATED WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR. IT'S ONE OF THOSE 
4 SITUATIONS WHERE THE CLAIM WAS NOT A COMPLETE SURPRISE TO HIM. 
5 I BELIEVE THAT IF THE PARTIES ARE IN THE LAWSUIT, THE 
6 PLEADINGS COULD ALWAYS BE AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE. 
7 THE MOTION TO AMEND THAT PLEADING WAS NOT MADE, WAS MADE IN 
8 ENOUGH TIME TO RESPOND OR TO BE PREPARED FOR IT. AND I 
9 ANALYZED IT AND DECIDED THAT I WOULD GRANT THE MOTION AND 
10 ALLOW THAT CLAIM TO BE STATED AND THAT IT WOULDN'T PREJUDICE 
11 ANYONE UNDULY. 
12 AND I HAD TO BE THINKING AT THE TIME, AND I RULE 
13 NOW THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS NOT RUN BECAUSE OF HIS 
14 BEING IN THE LAWSUIT FRCM '31, THAT THE CLAIM COULD HAVE 
15 REASONABLY BEEN ASSENTED 3CTH PARTIES WERE IN THIS LAWSUIT. 
16 AND I THINK THE STATUTE WOULD NOT HAVE BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL THE 
17 DATE OF TRIAL. 
18 LATCHES: AGAIN, THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE BOTH 
19 PARTIES WERE IN HERE. MR. MILLER, FROM HIS TESTIMONY HERE 
20 TODAY, AND MR. WEYLAND, BOTH, MUST BE A LITTLE DISTRESSED WITH 
21 THE COURT'S SYSTEM WITH HC77 LCNG IT TAXES TC DC THINGS. AS AN 
22 OFFICER OF THE COURT HERE, AS THE LAWYERS, AS EVERYBODY'S 
23 AWARE, DUE PROCESS DOES TAKE TIME. BUT DUE TO A SERIES OF 
24 EVENTS THAT WERE UNCONTROLLABLE, IN MY OPINION, BY VIRTUE OF 
25 THIS CASE AND WHAT HAPPENED HERE, THIS IS ONE OF THOSE CASES 
6 
1 THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BEFORE NOW. I AM TRYING TO 
2 LOOK AT IT AND DO WHAT I THINK IS A FAIR AND ADEQUATE RESULT. 
3 AND THOSE ARE MY FINDINGS. IS THERE ANYTHING I HAVE NOT RULED 
4 ON THAT I NEED TO? 
5 MR. MADSEN: JUST ONE RELATED ISSUE, YOUR HONOR. 
6 AND I THINK I WOULD LIKE, IF THE COURT IS WILLING, TO HAVE THE 
7 COURT RULE THAT THE FAILING TO RESPOND AND DO THE ACCOUNTING 
8 AND SO ON BY MR. WEYLAND WAS DELIBERATE IN THAT SENSE, THAT IT 
9 WAS A DELIBERATE RATHER THAN JUST NEGLIGENCE IN EFFECT. THIS 
10 ISN'T JUST SOME ORDINARY JUDGMENT DEBT. HE HAD A FIDUCIARY 
11 DUTY IN THIS INSTANCE THAT HE DIDN'T COMPLY WITH. I AM NOT 
12 ASKING THE COURT TO FIND HIM IN CONTEMPT, BUT I AM ASKING THE 
13 COURT TO RULE THAT IT WAS DELIBERATE. AND ON THAT BASIS WE 
14 SHCULC HAVE A FINDING TO THAT EFFECT. 
15 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL. I THINK FROM THE EVIDENCE. 
IS ADDUCED, AND MY ATTITUDE, MY RESPONSE TO MR. WEYLAND'S 
17 RESPONSE FROM THIS RECORD IN TERMS OF THAT WAS THAT HE DID NOT 
13 RESPOND. THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT IT WAS 
19 CONFUSING TO BOTH PARTIES WHERE THERE WAS AN INVENTORY 
2 0 FURNISHED, THE LETTER TO THE JUDGE REGARDING THE QUESTIONS 
21 A3CUT THAT OR -- IT WAS KIND OF A DIFFICULT SITUATION TO BOTH. 
22 I THINK THAT I WOULD MAKE A FINDING THAT HIS FAILURE TO 
23 ACCOUNT FOR SALES OR TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER WAS NOT TOTALLY 
24 EXCUSED, BUT I WOULD NOT GO AS FAR AS TO FIND THAT HE WOULD BE 
25 IN CONTEMPT, BECAUSE EVERYBODY WAS CONFUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD 
7 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J MILLER and MILLER 




MICHAEL D. ZELLMER and P & M 
DIVING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
Case No. 890800180CN 
Having considered the evidence now available, and 
reviewed the arguments of counsel, the court finds that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the partnership was in 
the winding up phase of its affairs. Thus, the partnership may 
be bound by the acts of Zellmer in entering into the sales 
agreement. Additionally, the court notes that Plaintiff has 
been well aware of Weyland's involvement in.these matters, and 
has attempted to obtain a stipulation from him, but apparently 
made no effort to join him in this action. Also, there is 
evidence that the Plaintiff by his execution seized property 
and inventory which was purchased by Weyland, and in which 
Defendant and Plaintiff had no interest or right. 
Based upon those findings, the motion of Weyland to 
intervene is granted, and the judgment is set aside. The 
default of Defendant Zellmer is not set aside. Plaintiff is 
ordered to return to Weyland by May 10, 1991, all of the 
property seized under the execution, and to designate 
specifically the items which he claims were purchased by 
Weyland under the sales agreement of June, 1990. During the 
pendency of this action, Weyland shall account for all sales 
and rentals of the equipment and inventory purchased from 
Zellmer, and shall weekly deposit with the court the accounting 
and the proceeds of such sales and rentals. 
Weyland shall file appropriate pleadings in furtherance 
of his motion to intervene within ten (10) days. The other 
parties shall then have twenty (20) days in which to respond. 
DATED this <5^dav of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^J^^^J<x^ czX, 
cc: Gordon Madsen 
Clark Allred 
Larry Steele 
sales over this period of time. 
FIRST CAVSE QF ACTI9N 
QUIET TITLE TO PERSONAL PROPER*] 
For a First Cause of Action, Intervenors claim and allege 
against Third-Party Defendants as follows: 
22. Intervenors reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
each and every allegation of paragraphs 1 - 2 1 above* 
<l 23. Intervenors own and are entitled to sole possession of all 
;r Sold Property, all Weyland's property and all other personal 
property located at 27 West Main, #8, City of Vernal, County of 
Uintah, State of Utah, which property was seized by Plaintiffs on 
March 29, 1991, and all or some of which has now been returned. 
A 24. Defendants do not claim an interest in the Property 
adverse to Intervenors. Plaintiffs do not claim an interest in the 
Weyland property. Plaintiffs claim an interest in the Sold 
Property adverse to Weyland. Zellmer, for himself and for the 
Third-Party Defendants sold all Property to Weyland on June 16, 
1990. At this time, Plaintiffs' claims are without any right 
whatever, and Plaintiffs have no estate, right, title, lien or 
interest in or to the Property or any part thereof. 
WHEREFORE, Weyland prays: 
A. That Third-Party Defendants and all persons claiming under 
them be required to set forth any and all claims in or to the 
9 
Property; 
B. That said claims be determined by a decree of this Court; 
C. That said decree declare and adjudge that Intervenors owns 
absolutely and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of 
the Property; and that Third-Party Defendants and all persons 
claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien or interest 
in or to the Property adverse to Weyland or ADI; 
D. That said decree pejrmanently enjoin Third-Party 
Defendants, each of them, and all persons except Intervenors 
claiming under them, from asserting any claim whatever in or to the 
Property adverse to Intervenors; 
E. For costs of this action and reasonable attorney's fees; 
F. For such other and further relief as the court deems just 
and property. 
SECQNP QAVSS QF ACTI9N 
TRESPASS T9 PERSONAL PR9PERTY 
7
&^ As a Second Cause of Action, Intervenors claim and allege 
against Plaintiffs and Dive Utah Vernal as followst 
25. Intervenors reallege and incorporate herein by reference 
each and every allegation paragraphs 1 - 2 4 above. 
26. On or about March 29, 1991, Intervenors were the owners 
7 and in possession of the Property of a reasonable value of 
10 
GORDON A. MADSEN #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLER, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET AL, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR TRIAL DATE 
Civil No. 890800180 CN 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Plaintiff and Third Party-Defendant James J. Miller, by 
and through his counsel of record, hereby certifies that in his 
judgment this case is ready for trial and represents as follows: 
1. That pleadings have come to a close in this matter. 
2. Discovery has been completed. 
3. That no motions are presently pending other than a 
motion from Defendant Michael Zellmer to be permitted to withdraw 
on grounds that his clients were filing bankruptcy. The remaining 
parties' pleadings are at issue and in the undersigned's opinion, 
settlement is not possible. 
Dated this 7th day of April, 
A. Madsen 
'Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Request for Trial Date to 
Larry Steele, Attorney for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
Michael Weyland, 319 West 100 South, Vernal, Utah 84078 this 7th 
day of April, 1993. 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: 298-6610 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLER, ET. AL., : 
Plaintiffs, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : Civil No. 890800180 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET. AL.f : Judge: Dennis L. Draney 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike came on for hearing before the 
above court on Tuesday, March 26, 1991 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., 
Plaintiff Miller being present and represented by Gordon A. Madsen, 
and Defendant was not present nor represented by counsel, and the 
court having received evidence that Defendant had been given due 
Notice of this hearing by registered mail, and having received evidence 
on behalf of Plaintiffs, and being fully advised in the premises 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendants1 
pleadings are stricken, and their default is enterred herein, and 
Plaintiffs are granted JUDGMENT against Defendants in the principal 
sum of $9,000.00, together with interest thereon from and after May 
23, 1989 at the legal rate of 10% until Judgment, and at the rate of 
12% from Judgment until paid, plus Plaintiffs costs of court. 
Execution may issue on said Judgment against the assets of 
P. & M. Diving, now known as Atlantis Diving, and Plaintiff, James J. 
Miller is designated as the Sherrifffs agent to hold said assets sub-
ject to Order of this Court for a period of thirty days from the date 
of execution thereon, in order for Michael Weylandr the putative 
party in possession of said assets presently to petition this court 
to assert whatever claim of interest in said assets he may assert. 
Failing to so petition within said thirty days shall make said Judgment 
and execution final. 
The Court reserves the issue of Attorney Fees until final 
disposition, 
DATED THIS 26th day of March, 1991. 
BY THE COURT 
District Judge 
GORDON A. MADSEN #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J- MILLER, ET AL, : 
Plaintiffs, : EXECUTION 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET AL, : Civil No. 890800180 CN 
Defendants. : Judge Dennis L. Draney 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Uintah County, State of Utah, 
Greetings: 
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered by this Court in said 
County, wherein is the judgment roll, on the 26th day of March, 
1991 in favor of Plaintiffs for the principal sum of $9,000.00 and 
$88.25 costs of suit, and interest from May 23, 1989 at the legal 
rate of 10% per annum to date of Judgment in the amount of 
$1,658.99, and from Judgment until paid at the rate of 12% per 
annum, with Attorney's Fees held under advisement until final 
disposition. 
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to command you to collect from P 
& M Diving and/or Atlantis Diving the aforesaid Judgment, Costs and 
Interest, together with costs of this Execution, and that you levy 
on and sell enough of the assets of said entities to satisfy the 
same with all legal costs accruing hereon, and this shall be your 
sufficient warrant for so doing; PROVIDED HOWEVER, pursuant to said 
Judgment, Plaintiff James J. Miller is designated your agent to 
hold said assets subject to Order of this Court for a period of 
thirty days to enable Michael Weyland, the party putatively in 
present possession of said assets to petition this Court to assert 
whatever claim of interest in said assets he may have. 
Within sixty days make due returns for this writ with 
your doings in the premises hereon endorsed. WHEREFORE FAIL NOT. 
Given under my hand and Seal of said Court this day 




GORDON A. MADSEN #2048 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLER, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, : PRAECIPE 
vs. : 
MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, ET AL, : Civil No. 890800180 CN 
Defendants. : Judge Dennis L. Draney 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
To the Sheriff of Uintah County, State of Utah, 
Greetings: 
In connection with the Execution issued in the above 
cause, be instructed that you are to levy and take possession of 
all the trade fixtures, inventory, stock in trade, records and 
equipment of said P & M Diving or Atlantis Diving located at 27 
West Main Street #8, Vernal, Utah, including, but limited to: 
Wet suits, gear bags, masks, snorkels, fins, boots, 
buoyancy compensators, lycra skins, spear poles, tips, guns and 
spear accessories, goodie bags, weight belts, ankle weights, and 
miscellaneous related gear and inventory. 
Compressors, and their accessories, hoses, hook-ups, 
etc., trade fixtures, display cases, racks and other display 
mountings, etc., desks, file cabinets, and records, cash drawer, 
audio-visual and T.V., V.C.R. diving books and literature, 
classroom equipment, etc. 
Rental equipment, wet suits, snorkels, boots, fins, 
weights and rental bags, regulators, tanks, and related rental 
equipment, etc. 
All back-room inventory or equipment not on display or 
belonging to said business(es) whether located on the premises or 
elsewhere. 
Gordon A. Madsen, Plaintiffs' 
Attorney 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS, #7177 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
1224 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone 364-3431 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, and P&M ] 
DIVERS, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion ; 
Defendants. 
MICHAEL WEYLAND and ATLANTIS ] 
DIVERS, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion 
Intervenors and Third 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES J. MILLER; MILLER DIVING, 
INC.; MICHAEL D. ZELLMER; P&M ] 
DIVING, INC.; and DIVE UTAH 
VERNAL a/k/a DIVE UTAH EAST, a ] 
Utah general Partnership, d/b/a 
ATLANTIS DIVERS, ] 
Third Party Defendants. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> CIVIL NO. 890800180 CN 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came on for trial on the 2nd 
day of Aprilf 1997, before the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, 
Judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff James J. Miller 
appeared in person and by and through his attorneys Gordon A. 
Madsen and Michael D. Cummings. Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff 
Michael Weyland appeared in person and by and through his attorney 
Daniel S. Sam. The court having heard and considered the testimony 
and evidence presented by the parties now makes and enters the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That prior to April, 1991 Plaintiff and former 
Defendant Michael D. Zellmer operated a partnership scuba diving 
equipment and training business in Vernal, Utah known as Dive Utah, 
Vernal. 
2. This action was brought to effect a judicial 
dissolution of the partnership. 
3. After commencement of this action and before the 
dissolution had been effected, Zellmer sold the business which he 
had renamed Atlantis Divers to Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff, 
Michael Weyland. The sale occurred in June of 1990. The purchase 
price was $15,388.21. 
4. Weyland had some knowledge of the partnership 
interest of Miller, and demanded and received a hold-harmless 
writing from Zellmer, but did nothing further by way of 
investigation of Miller's interest. Zellmer subsequently moved to 
California and received a discharge in Bankruptcy. 
5. Weyland's purchase was not a purchase in ordinary 
course of business, but the purchase of a going business in whole. 
6. Neither Miller nor Weyland filed a claim in the 
Zellmer bankruptcy. 
7. Miller had, pursuant to Order of this court 
2 
repossessed the assets of the business, and on April 9, 1991 
Weyland moved this court for.leave to intervene as Third-Party 
Plaintiff and to set aside the original Judgment against Zellmer. 
The motions were granted, and Weyland has been a party to this 
action from that date to the present. 
8. Miller was ordered to return the assets to Weyland 
and Weyland was ordered to account to the court for the rental and 
sale of those assets on a weekly basis. No accounting was ever 
rendered. 
9. Some confusion appeared from the evidence to show 
what assets were to be accounted for excusing Weyland in the 
court's mind from liability for being held in contempt. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes and 
enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff Weyland was not a 
purchaser for value without notice. The sale to Weyland was both 
with notice, and in the nature of a bulk sale, rather than in the 
ordinary course of business. 
2. Since Weyland has been a party to this action 
continuously since April, 1991, neither Laches nor any Statute of 
Limitations applies herein, since amendment to pleadings, as 
allowed herein, to conform to the facts could have been granted at 
any time until Judgment. 
3. Weyland has converted partnership assets to his own 
purposes without ever accounting to this court therefor. 
3 
4. Plaintiff Miller is entitled to Judgment for one 
half of the $15,388.21 purchase price of the assets, or $7,694.11. 
5. Plaintiff Miller is further entitled to interest at 
the Judgment rate from April 9, 1991 through date of trial, April 
2, 1997, as follows: 
herein. 
1991 - 12.0% 
1992 • 12.0% 
1993 - 5.72% 
1994 - 5.61% 
1995 = 9.22% 
1996 = 7.35% 
1997 = 7.45% 










Neither party should be awarded attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff should be awarded his costs incurred 
Dated this day of 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Michael Weyland 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were mailed to Daniel S. Sam, attorney for Defendant-Third 
Party Plaintiff, Michael Weyland, at his address 319 West 100 
South, Suite A, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS, #7177 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
1224 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone 364-3431 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




MICHAEL D. ZELLMER, and P&M 
DIVERS, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion 
Defendants. 
MICHAEL WEYLAND and ATLANTIS ] 
DIVERS, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion ] 
Interveners and Third ] 
Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES J. MILLER; MILLER DIVING, 
INC.; MICHAEL D. ZELLMER; P&M ] 
DIVING, INC.; and DIVE UTAH 
VERNAL a/k/a DIVE UTAH EAST, a ) 
Utah general Partnership, d/b/a 
ATLANTIS DIVERS, ) 
Third Party Defendants. ] 
) JUDGMENT 
) CIVIL NO. 890800180 CN 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came on for trial on the 2nd 
day of April, 1997, before the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, 
Judge of the above entitled court. Plaintiff James J. Miller 
appeared in person and by and through his attorneys Gordon A. 
Madsen and Michael D. Cummings. Defendant and third party 
plaintiff Michael Weyland appeared in person and by and through his 
attorney Daniel S. Sam. The court having heard and considered the 
testimony and evidence presented by the parties and having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
The plaintiff James Miller is awarded a judgment against 
Michael Weyland Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff in the amount of 
$7,694.11 together with interest in the amount of $3,941.28, plus 
costs of court. 
Dated this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
DANIEL S. SAM 
Attorney for Michael Weyland 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed to Daniel S. 
Sam, attorney for Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff, Michael Weyland, 
at his address 319 West 100 South, Suite A, Vernal, Utah 84078. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
